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Abstract
Pressure on health care systems due to the increasing expenditures of
the elderly population is pushing policy makers to adopt new regulation and
payment schemes for nursing home services. We sketch a simple theoreti-
cal model to predict the behavior of nursing homes under di¤erent payment
schemes. We then investigate the implications of prospective payments on
nursing home costs using a panel of 41 homes in Southern Switzerland ob-
served over a 12-years period (1999-2010). To evaluate the impact of the
recent policy change - from retrospective to prospective payment - we em-
ploy a xed e¤ects model with a time trend that is allowed to change after
the policy reform. We nd evidence that the new payment system reduces
costs for nursing home care, ceteris paribus. This result is in line with the
theoretical expectations.
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1 Introduction
Increasing health care expenditures for the elderly population is a major concern
for society and policymakers. In Europe, the percentage of people over 64 rose
rapidly in the past decades and is expected to increase between two and six times
by 2060, ranging from 22-25% in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom, to 33-36% in Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Slo-
vakia. The share of very elderly people (80 and over) in the EU15 experienced
the highest increase among all age classes, from 1.2% in 1950 to 4.2% in 2010,
and is projected to almost triple (12%) by 2060 in the EU27 (Eurostat, 2012; Eu-
ropean Union, 2012). Accordingly, the demand of nursing home care is expected
to increase rapidly raising the burden on public resources generally used to cover
nursing home costs or to subsidize prices of nursing home services (Karlsson et
al., 2006).
In the past 30 years hopes have been pinned on the possibility to control
healthcare expenditures by replacing Retrospective (RPS) with Prospective Pay-
ment Systems (PPS), mainly in the hospital sector. Under PPS, a predetermined,
xed amount of resources is paid for the service. The rationale is that reimburse-
ment based on ex-ante costs prevents health care providers from giving unneces-
sary care (Jegers et al., 2002). In the U.S., the use of PPS has been extended from
hospitals to the nursing home sector in 1997 through the Balanced Budget Act.
Similarly, many European countries have recently incorporated more incentivizing
payment systems into their existing funding systems.
Although the health economics literature is rich of studies on the impact of
PPS in the U.S. nursing home sector (e.g. Chen and Shea, 2002; Norton, 1992;
Zhang et al., 2008), there is little empirical evidence in Europe. A number of
studies have been published on the impact of PPS in the hospital sector in di¤erent
European countries, for instance Finland (Linna, 2000), Norway (Biorn et al.,
2006), and Portugal (Dismuke and Sena, 1999). To our knowledge, the only study
on the impact of PPS to nance nursing home services is the recent analysis
by Dormont and Martin (2012) based on a hypothetical scenario. The authors
investigate the costs-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ in French nursing homes (NHs) to predict
possible implications of a switch in the payment system.
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In this paper, we provide evidence on the impact of PPS on the costs of a
sample of NHs operating in one Swiss canton (Ticino) by exploiting data before
and after the introduction of PPS. Switzerland is a federal state in which the
provision and regulation of nursing home care for elderly people is organized at the
regional level (cantons). As consequence, 26 very di¤erent nursing home sectors
exist. In 2006, the cantonal authority substituted the previously-in-force payment
system based on acknowledged nancial needs (RPS) with an ex-ante determined
budget (PPS). To evaluate the impact of this policy change we use an econometric
model with xed-e¤ects (FE) with a time trend that is allowed to change after the
policy reform. We will provide evidence that the new payment system reduced
costs growth for NH care, after controlling for the quality of services.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of recent studies analyzing the impact of PPS on costs, quality and
access to health care services. Section 3 describes the regulatory reform and
proposes a simple theoretical model to infer the behavior of NHs under the old
RPS and the new PPS. Data and the identication strategy for the policy change
are discussed in section 4. The econometric estimations are presented in section
5, and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Previous research on the impact of PPS in nursing
home care
The empirical evidence regarding the impact of PPS on costs, quality and access
in NHs care is not conclusive. The literature mostly relies on studies conducted
during the 90s in the U.S. where PPS were rstly introduced. Some of these
studies focus on the nancial consequences of PPS by looking at changes in costs
(e.g. Ohsfeldt et al., 1991; Sexton et al., 1989). More recently, attention has been
devoted to the understanding of cost reduction achievements. Improved methods
to control for changes in quality and to cope with the potential endogeneity of
output and/or quality in cost functions have been proposed (Gertler and Wald-
man, 1992; Chen and Shea, 2002). Also, direct assessment of the impact of PPS
on quality (Konetzka et al., 2004; Konetzka et al., 2006) and access to nursing
care (Coburn et al., 1993) have been carried out.
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Regarding the e¤ects on costs, Sexton et al. (1989) use a two steps strategy to
regress e¢ ciency scores calculated using Data Envelopment Analysis on changes in
the payment system occurred in the State of Maine in 1982. They nd a decrease
in technical e¢ ciency. Quality variations are assumed to be negligible. Ohsfeldt
et al. (1991) exploit variations in the payment systems of 47 U.S. states over a
12-years period using a random e¤ects model. After correcting for endogeneity in
the reimbursement system by means of instrumental variables, the authors nd a
reduction of 20 per cent in per diem costs due to PPS.
Coburn et al. (1993) extend the traditional cost analysis by looking at the
consequences of PPS on quality and access for Medicaid patients in the State
of Maine. The analysis shows that PPS reduces growth in per-patient variable
costs. During the rst three years after the introduction of PPS, the average
savings and losses per patient day decreased substantially. Afterward, the authors
observed a remarkable increase in the number of NHs experiencing losses. Only the
percentage of room and board costs relative to the total variable costs decreased
over time, suggesting that cost savings were not achieved through reductions in
quality. Finally, the percentage of Medicaid patients decreased, which can be
interpreted as a negative impact on access for most severe patients.
Concerns about the evidence obtained during the 90s are raised by Chen and
Shea (2002), who question the methodology used. In particular, they point at the
inadequate measures of quality and output/quality endogeneity in cost functions.
To cope with the endogeneity issue, the authors construct instrumental variables
for both output and quality, and investigate the impact of PPS on short-term
operating costs. The analysis is performed on a one-year data set of di¤erent U.S.
states grouped into three di¤erent payment systems. The authors show that NHs
with PPS are no longer signicantly cheaper than facilities subject to cost-based
retrospective payments, after controlling for quality di¤erences.
More recently Zhang et al. (2008) assessed the impact of PPS on the cost
e¢ ciency of 8361 NHs in the U.S. over the period 1997-2003. During this period,
three major policy changes occurred. In 1997, the Balance Budget Act (BBA)
ratied the introduction of PPS. Afterward, the Balanced Budget Renement Act
(BBRA, 2000) and the Benet Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA, 2001) in-
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creased the baseline payments in consequence of the nancial di¢ culties reported
by NHs. DEA calculated e¢ ciency scores are regressed on policy change variables
identied with time markers and a truncated random e¤ect model is applied. The
results show a negative relationship of all policy change variables with e¢ ciency
scores. The authors capture quality di¤erences by weighting the output with a
score calculated using the number of deciency citations.
A growing strand of literature investigates the impact of PPS on quality
aspects of nursing home care. Using data on U.S. NHs over the period 1996-
2000, Konetzka et al. (2004) study the impact of PPS on quality by applying a
di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach and a negative binomial model. The authors use
changes in the professional sta¢ ng and the number of regulatory deciencies as
proxies for quality. As expected, PPS is found to signicantly reduce the profes-
sional sta¤. The negative impact of PPS is partially corrected by the introduction
of the Balanced Budget Renement Act. As with respect to regulatory decien-
cies, only weak evidence is reported. Also, no di¤erences between for-prot and
nonprot NHs are found.
Finally, Konetzka et al. (2006) investigate the spillover e¤ects of introduc-
ing PPS in Medicare residents on quality for Medicaid patients. Since facilities
cross-subsidize part of the costs of Medicaid residents with the higher margins
of Medicare and high private-pay residents, the cuts in revenue due to the in-
troduction of PPS may also have a¤ected quality of long-stay residents. Using a
quasi-experimental approach in four U.S. states over the period 1995-2000, the au-
thors show that PPS has an adverse e¤ect on urinary tract infections and pressure
scores.
To conclude, the literature remains inconclusive as with respect to the impact
of PPS in nursing home care. Also, it is worth pointing out that most of the studies
mentioned are conducted in the U.S. where private for-prot facilities represent a
large share of total NHs and the environment is increasingly competitive. It is not
clear whether this leads to di¤erent behavioral responses as compared to nonprot
institutions which are largely present in Europe. In competitive environments,
the expected negative impact of cost reductions on quality may be mitigated by
the need to maintain a high reputation. As suggested by Grabowski and Town
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(2011), NHs facing greater competition are more responsive to quality improving
projects. However, competition can also have a negative e¤ect on quality if it
pushes prices down (Forder and Allan, 2012). Conversely, in a non-competitive,
nonprot environment with highly regulated prices and quality, such as the Swiss
NH sector, the possible negative impact of cost reductions on quality is expected
to be limited.
3 The regulatory reform
3.1 Background
In Ticino, nursing home care is provided primarily by regulated public and private
nonprot organizations. The provision of nursing care is further decentralized
at local level (municipalities) and elderly people are commonly assigned to the
NH in the community of residence. Therefore, NHs operate as local monopolies
with virtually no competition. Price and quality are regulated by the cantonal
authority, i.e. the Regional Department of Public Health (RDPH). Prices are
subsidized and dened by the RDPH as a function of residentsincome (pensions
rent) and wealth, and do not vary across NHs. Quality is regulated in many
aspects, in particular structural and procedural. Because of tight regulation the
production process is highly homogeneous.
In 2006, the cantonal authority in Ticino introduced global budgets for nursing
home care. Prior to the introduction of global budgets, subsidies to providers of
long term care were allocated by the cantonal authority based on acknowledged
nancial needs; a form of soft budget constraint. The payment system consisted
of two parts: a prospectively dened component and a retrospective, upward
adjustment based on actual costs at the end of the year. The prospective part was
an estimation of the costs for the following operative year based on a combination
of historical costs and benchmarking parameters at the sector level. At the end
of the year, more nancial resources were paid if the NH was able to justify
additional expenses. Conversely, service providers with year-end costs below the
initially estimated nancial need were not allowed to retain the savings. The
cantonal authority viewed this system as inationary and poorly incentivizing.
The low exibility of the system due to the detailed control over all cost items
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made it almost impossible for the management to make decisions on the cost
structure, and led to low responsibility as with respect to budget decisions and
nancial performance. The funding system had the adverse incentive to spend
the whole amount of resources provided.
In the early 2000s, to respond to the need of improving transparency and
e¢ ciency in long term care, the RDPH modied the payment system. To develop
a new funding system based on prospectively dened payment rates, a pilot phase
was lunched in January 2003. Five NHs were selected to partecipate to the pilot
phase over a three-years period. Information collected during these years were
used to dene the list of services provided, an analytical accounting system, and
a package of modern managerial tools. Since January 2006, the system has been
applied to all NHs.
The current payment system (global budget) is composed of two elements: an
individual component and a standardized part. The individual component mainly
covers xed costs such as rents and expenses for education trainings. The standard
component includes four main categories of costs: residential, animation, care and
therapies. Global budgets are calculated by the multiplying standard prices (also
called prospective rates in the literature) with quantities. Standard prices stem
from the analytical accounting register and reect median costs in the nursing
home industry classied into nine categories according to size. Also, standard
prices are calculated to implicitly dene the level of e¢ ciency and quality desired
by the cantonal authority. Quantities are given by the number of beds times
the level of occupancy and yearly-days. For nursing care services, the number
of resident-days is weighted by the NH-specic case-mix index calculated by the
RDPH.
The starting prospective rate was determined for the year 2005, while the
prospective payment rates for the following years were adjusted for inationary
changes of some cost items only (e.g. wages). An adjustment based on savings
achieved in the previous years is planned to occur on a medium-term perspective
depending on the nancial stability of the NHs and has not been applied yet.
The nal budget does not depend on the actual costs generated by the res-
idents. NHs with end-year costs lower than the global budget are entitled to
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retain a share (25%) of the savings. The main part (75%) are saved as mandatory
reserves to cover previous or future decits. This system is expected to ensure
nancial stability of nursing care providers in the medium-term.
A discussed possible consequence of the new payment system is the negative
impact on quality levels of nursing home services. This risk may be higher with
excess of demand since incentives to compete are lower. However, the existing
regulation of structural and procedural aspects of the production and provision
of nursing home care is expected to strongly limit this possibility. For example,
the RDPH denes the number of care givers in each NH as well as their education
level. To further reduce this potential negative e¤ect, new systems of quality
promotion and control in terms of outcome have been integrated.
3.2 A simple model
Before assessing the impact of the new payment system empirically, we sketch a
simple theoretical model to illustrate di¤erences in the behaviour of NHs under
the old and the new payment schemes, respectively the soft budget constraint
(RPS) and the prospective payment (PPS) introduced recently. The demand of
nursing home care is independent of prices because fees are established by the
RDPH and are homogenous across the canton. Moreover, similarly to Chalkley
and Malcomson (1998), the demand of nursing home care does not reect quality.1
Building on Di Giorgio et al. (2012) we dene NH total costs as:
C = e   e (1)
where e ;  is an exogenous cost component with  >  and probability dis-
tribution Pr( = ) = q and Pr( = ) = 1   q, and only partially observable by
the regulator.2 The last term (e) in the equation (1) is cost-reducing e¤ort. We
1The typical arguments supporting this assumption are two. First, patients may not be able
to assess the multidimensional nature of quality. Second, quality is partially an experience good
and is observable only after receiving care. These aspects are particularly relevant in the case of
nursing care due to the type of patients and the nature of the service. Also, in the Swiss context,
individuals do not have free choice of the NHs and the allocation occurs according to the place
of residence. Finally, the regulator sets quality standards which are equal for all NHs included
in the sample, resulting in a very homogenous sector of nursing care.
2This reects, for instance, the number of days spent by NH residents. While the number of
residents per year is known in advance due to an excess of demand, uncertainty remains about
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normalize the population of patients to one, so that eq. (1) is also the average
cost function. The prospective budget is a function P (; q) of costs the NH is
expected to incur during the operating year:
P (; q) = q + (1  q). (2)
The NH maximizes the following objective function:
U =W   i (B   C)2   (e) (3)
where W represents exogenous benets from the production of nursing home ser-
vices, and i (

i ; 
) captures the marginal impact of an unbalanced budget from
the ith payment scheme (i  [RPS; PPS]) where:


PPS = 
(  1) 0 <   1,  > 0 (4)
and


RPS =  PPS . (5)
Note that two scenarios are possible: over nancing ( = ) and under nanc-
ing
 
 = 

. Remember that the budget is dened by the RDPH as a weighted
average of the structural cost parameter (eq. 2). Using (1) and (2), we then
observe that for  =  we have B C > 0 for any level of e¤ort e. Conversely, for
 = , we have B   C  0 for any e 2 [0; ebal].3 Consequently, eq. (3) assumes
that undernancing reduces NH utility under both payment regimes, RPS and
PPS, since > 0. Conversely, incentives for the two regimes di¤er in the case
of overnancing since RPS 6= PPS . Under the old payment regime (RPS), NHs
were not allowed to retain resources in excess at the end of the year. Substituting
(4) in to (5) and then (5) into the utility function dened by (3), we see that
prots decrease. Moreover, the marginal impact of prots is generally lower than
the marginal impact of losses (  1  1). Under the new PPS system, NHs are
the type and intensity of care needed by residents. Also, uncertainty is related to structural costs
for standard daily activities, such as eating and other physical activities, or costs related to the
geographical location of the NH.
3Note that the equilibrium level of e¤ort for  =  is always lower that ebal. See Table 1 for
details.
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entitled to retain resources in excess. Since RPS =  PPS , we allow surpluses
to increase utility under the PPS regime only. Finally, (e) is the disutility of
e¤ort to reduce costs, which is increasing in the level of e¤ort, with d=de > 0
and d2=de2 > 0. We specify the disutility of e¤ort as (e) = 2e
2, with  > 2.
The marginal impact of e¤ort on NHs utility is then captured by the parameter
.
To calculate the optimal level of e¤ort, we rst substitute (1), (2) and (e)
into (3) and derive the following rst-order condition:
dU
de
=  2i
h
(   e)  q(   ) + ei  e = 0. (6)
We then solve (6) for the equilibrium level of e¤ort under the two nancing regimes
(RPS and PPS) and scenarios (undernancing and overnancing). The results
are summarized in Table (1) where  = 2 for simplicity.
RPS PPS
 =  eSBC =
q( )
+ e

PPS =
q( )
+
 =  e

SBC = 0 e

PPS =
(1 )(1 q)( )
 (1 ).
Table 1: Equilibrium level of cost reducing e¤orts under di¤erent payment systems
and structural costs.
As expected, no di¤erences in incentives arise between the two regimes in
the case of undernancing ( = ). However, the new regime (PPS) provides
more incentives to cost containment in the case of overnancing if  < 1 and
 > 0.Therefore, the ability of the new payment system to control costs is related
to the importance that NHs attach to additional resources, which is captured by
 (  1) =2 or  (  1) as dened by (4). This weight may be relatively weak
since NHs operating in our context are generally nonprot rms. One last consid-
eration arises from the impact of the parameter . Since NHs are nonprot rms,
 may represent not only the marginal cost of e¤ort to reorganize the production
process and save costs but also the disutility caused by reducing working time per
employee or the number of employees. If those costs are very high (e.g.  !1),
then cost reducing e¤ort tends to zero under both regimes, and incentives are
invariant.
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4 Empirical specication
4.1 The cost function
To empirically investigate the impact of global budget payments in nursing home
care, we exploit data from a natural experiment in Switzerland where the payment
system recently changed from RPS to PPS. Similarly to Di Giorgio et al (2012),
we assume that NHs transform two inputs, capital and labor, into a single output,
measured by the number of patient-days of nursing home care.4 Since the produc-
tion process is highly homogenous among NHs, the number of resident-days can
represent a good indicator of the level of production. Consequently, we specify a
total costs function5 which depends on output (Y ), price of capital and labor (Pk
and Pl), two output characteristics (Q1 and Q2),6 and a general time trend ().
C = f(Y; Pk; Pl; Q1; Q2; ). (7)
The price of labor is calculated as the weighted average wage of di¤erent
professional categories employed in the NH (doctors, nurses, administrative and
technical sta¤), while the price of capital is derived from the residual approach,
i.e. labor costs are subtracted from total costs and the residual is divided by the
capital stock approximated by the number of beds. Q1 is an index which measures
the average patients assistance by means of normal daily activities such as eating,
personal care or physiological activities. This is calculated on a yearly basis by the
cantonal authority. Patients are classied in one out of ve categories according
to their severity level. A value between 0 and 4 is assigned where higher values
indicate more severe cases. Q2 is the nursing sta¤ ratio, that is the ratio between
the number of nurses employed in a NH and the number of nurses that should be
employed according to the guidelines of the cantonal authority.
4 In this study we employ a similar model specication to explore a di¤erent research question
based on an updated dataset.
5 In a non-competitive environment such as the Swiss one, there is no reason to assume that
NHs minimize costs. In this case, the cost function is a behavioral cost function (Evans, 1971)
and can still be used to make a comparison among rms. Moreover, by estimating a total cost
function instead of a variable cost function we avoid the risk related to a high correlation between
capital stock and output, which leads to a positive relationship between variable costs and capital
stock. A similar approach is used, for instance, by Farsi and Filippini (2004).
6 In order to estimate a cost function, either the output is assumed to be homogenous or we
need to control for service intensity and patientscharacteristics (Birnbaum et al., 1981).
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Because nursing home care is a labor-intensive service, the nursing sta¤ ratio
can be considered as a good indicator of quality (see for example Johnson-Pawlson
and Infeld, 1996; Schnelle et al., 2004). Labor costs represent the main costs of a
NH and make about 85 per cent of total costs. Consequently, a small change in
the nursing sta¤ ratio may a¤ect total costs considerably. The nursing sta¤ ratio
is, therefore, a key variable in our analysis since NHs with relatively high costs
may decide to decrease the proportion or the "quality" of workers to save money.
If this is the case, then the estimates could su¤er from endogeneity bias. To test
the endogeneity of this regressor, we perform the robust Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test.7
In order to impose as few restrictions as possible to (7), we adopt a exible
translog functional form approximated at the median value. Input prices and
total costs are divided by the price of capital in order to satisfy the homogeneity
condition in input prices.8 The translog approximation to (7) can be written as:
ln

C
Pk

= Y lnY + Q1 lnQ1 + Q2 lnQ2 + Pl ln
Pl
Pk
(8)
+
1
2
Y Y (lnY )
2 +
1
2
Q1Q1(lnQ1)
2 +
1
2
Q2Q2(lnQ2)
2
+
1
2
PlPl

ln
Pl
Pk
2
+ Y Q1 lnY lnQ1 + Y Q2 lnY lnQ2
+Y Pl lnY ln
Pl
Pk
+ Q1Pl lnQ1 ln
Pl
Pk
+ Q1Q2 lnQ1 lnQ2
+PlQ2 ln
Pl
Pk
lnQ2 + t + "
where " is the error term. We check for the concavity condition in input prices
after the estimation.
7The test is robust to arbitraily violations of conditional homoskedasticity and clustering,
and consists in estimating the model by a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator
and applying the Sargan statistic. We perform this test using the lagged value of Q2 as an
instrumental variable. The test statistic is 2 distributed with a robust score 2(1) = 0:49 or
F (1; 234) = 0:395. The null hypothesis of exogenous Q2 cannot be rejected at any standard level
of signicance.
8The cost function is linear homogenous of degree 1 in input prices when a 10% increase in
all input prices leads to a 10% increase in total costs.
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4.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Our study builds on data extracted from annual reports delivered to the cantonal
authority by all regulated NHs scattered in canton Ticino, Switzerland. The
initial data set contains 50 NHs observed over a 12-years period (1999   2010).
This period includes the 7-year period before and the 5-year period after imple-
mentation of global budgets. From this initial sample, we exclude 5 NHs either
because a considerable share of the output (patient-days) is produced in foyers9
or because they show unreasonable values for some variables of interest and are
therefore dropped.10 Finally, we exclude the NHs selected for the pilot phase of
global budget adoption, for three main reasons: rst, the pilot phase was mainly
intended to set down the rules of the new payment system and to understand its
functioning. The new payment system was introduced stepwise and adjusted over
time. Second, pilot NHs are few and are observed for a too short period (3 years)
to be used as control group. Third, these NHs were not randomly selected.11
The nal sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 41 NHs observed for 12
years (471 observations). The minimum number of observations per cluster is
7, while on average information are available over almost the whole period (11:5
years). In Table 2 we report some descriptive statistics of the characteristics of
NHs, which include the mean, the standard deviation, and the rst and third
quartiles.
On average, NHs have 67 beds and provides services for 23450 resident days
yearly, each of which costs about CHF 240. The nursing sta¤ ratio is 0:96 indi-
cating that, on average, the personnel employed by NHs is close to the amount
suggested by the cantonal authority. The average price of labor is about CHF
80000 per year, while the price of capital is CHF 14419 per bed.
9Foyers are external residential apartments where the healthiest patients get nursing care.
Therefore, the production process of these NHs might di¤er a lot as compared to the others.
10These are private for-prot institutions that have been placed under the cantonal authority
and largely subsidized. This implied a change in the production process and hardly comparable
data.
11 In Table 7 (attached) we show that pilot NHs are relatively cheaper than non pilot NHs.
Also, in Tabel 8 (attached) we show that also the cost evolution over time di¤ers between the
two groups: pilot NHs experience a more important cost increase before the pilot phase, while
from the extended introduction of the new payment system their costs increase relatively less
than non pilot NHs.
13
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev. 1st q. 3rd q.
AC Average cost per resident day 239.50 27.40 219.25 257.45
Y Total resident days per year 23450 8523 17373 27664
Q1 Average dependency index 3.10 0.35 2.87 3.36
Q2 Nursing sta¤ ratio 0.96 0.09 0.91 1.00
Pl Average labor price 81102 4963 77893 84522
per employee per year
Pk Average capital price 14419 3466 12084 16057
per bed
K Number of beds 67 24 49 80
Notes: All monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs (CHF) adjusted by the national Consumer Price
Index.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of costs, inputs and output characteristics over the
whole period.
A considerable variation is observed across NHs in almost all variables. The
average cost per resident day of the rst quartile is around CHF 220, and increases
to almost CHF 260 in the third quartile. The size of NHs also varies remarkably:
three quarter of NHs provide less than 80 beds, and the biggest NH has 145
beds (value not shown). This sizable variation can be read also in the number of
resident days.
As with respect to input prices, we recognize that variation in average costs
per employee is relatively small (around CHF 6500 per year), whereas average
price of capital in the third quartile is 25% higher than in the rst quartile. This
heterogeneity in the price of capital is mainly due to di¤erences in depreciation
policies, donations and/or capital structure. In addition, NHs vary in output char-
acteristics, i.e. the dependency index and the nursing sta¤ ratio. Note, however,
that 50% of NHs have a nursing sta¤ ratio between 0:91 and 1. This is because
the cantonal authority allows NHs to deviate from the value of reference by 10%
only. Beyond this threshold, the RDPH intervenes to ask for an adjustment in
the number of employees.
In Table 3 we provide some descriptive statistics for the variables of interest,
calculated separately for the period before the change in the payment system
(PRE) and the following period (POST). The fourth column species whether
the variable mean has increased (+) or decreased ( ). Finally, we report the
results of a t-test on the probability of equal means across the two periods. Since
cost savings can be achieved through a reduction in the number of sta¤, for the
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nursing sta¤ ratio (Q2) we test whether the mean value has decreased (one-sided
t-test).
Variables PRE POST Variation H0 p-value
(266 obs.) (205 obs.)
AC 229.621 252.380 + PRE = POST 0.000
Y 22804 24288 + PRE = POST 0.061
Q1 3.061 3.158 + PRE = POST 0.003
Q2 0.983 0.933   PRE > POST 0.000
Pl 79425 83278 + PRE = POST 0.000
Pk 13338 15820 + PRE = POST 0.000
K 65.278 68.941 + PRE = POST 0.010
Notes: all monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs (CHF) adjusted by the national Consumer Price
Index.
Table 3: Comparison of means (pre and post reform) for the main variables of
interest.
The pre-post analysis shows a statistically signicant increase in average costs
(AC), from about CHF 230 per resident day to more than CHF 250. However,
since costs have generally increased, these gures do not allow any inference about
the impact of the new payment system. The number of beds and the number of
resident days remained pretty constant. As for output characteristics, the analysis
shows that the dependency index has slightly increased while the nursing sta¤
ratio decreased by 5% points. The increase in the dependency index may be due
to the increasing demand of nursing home care over time and the shift of less
severe residents to home care services. Also, it shows that, as expected, NHs did
not respond to the change in the payment system by selecting healthier patients.
Conversely, NHs may have responded to the change in the payment system by
reducing the number of nurses per resident. The issue is discussed in more detail
in section 5.3.
4.3 Identication strategy
At the bottom of any policy evaluation lays a missing data problem. In fact, an in-
dividual or a rm can always be observed only in one state: either in the program
or not. The challenge of any evaluation analysis consists, therefore, in construct-
ing an appropriate counterfactual. When the policy change occurs for only a few
subjects under investigation or it is implemented gradually at di¤erent points in
time, a battery of evaluation methods can be considered (Blundell and Dias, 2000;
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2009; Nichols, 2007). Among the methods available for panel data, we nd the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach (DID), the matching estimator, the regression
discontinuity designs (RD), selection models (also called control functions), struc-
tural models, the regression approach, and the counterfactual analysis. All these
methods are motivated by the omitted-variable bias since correlation of policy
identifying variables with other unobservable variables might lead to an incorrect
assessment of the policy.
As pointed out by Blundell and Dias (2009), the choice of the most appropriate
evaluation method relies on the nature of the policy change, as well as the research
question and data availability. In our study, the policy change concerns all NHs
in the sample at the same time. For this reason we can just observe the treated
group before and after the policy change. Therefore, to measure the impact of
global budget payment we exploit the panel properties of the dataset. The under-
lying idea is to use information on di¤erent points in time for the same individual
as own group of control (individual e¤ects). We use a panel data model that
controls for unobserved heterogenity and includes a temporal dummy variable to
capture the impact of the policy change. This strategy assumes that no other ma-
jor event occured over the period considered which a¤ected the production costs
of NHs. We are condent that, in our case, this assumption is not too restrictive.
First, because the NH sector is highly regulated and no other policy reforms have
occurred during the same period. Second, the resulting homogenous production
process makes it relatively easy to compare NHs and reduce the unobserved het-
erogeneity to negligible levels.12 Consequently, time varying unobserved factors
are not expected to have remarkable e¤ects on the results. Finally, input prices
and costs have been deated with the CPI. Hence, reduction in costs due to the
recent economic recession should not be counfounded with cost savings generated
by the new payment system.
We capture the impact of PPS on costs with a dummy variable equal to 1 for
the years 2006   2010, the period where the PPS was in force, in addition to a
general time trend capturing the impact of technical change on costs throughout
the whole period. This is the approach adopted in many policy evaluation studies
12That unobserved heterogeneity is negligible is proved also by the similarity of the xed e¤ects
and random e¤ects estimates.
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when the policy change a¤ects all rms/individuals at the same time (e.g. Hat-
ton, 2005; Nakahara et al., 2010; Narayana and Pengb, 2006; Rotte and Vogler,
1999).13
When adopting this identication strategy, particular attention needs to be
devoted to the specication of the time trend. In fact, a mispecied time trend
may partially capture the impact of the policy change. Hence, to explore the
pattern of nursing care costs over time, we estimate a cost model where we replace
the time trend with time dummies and drop the policy change dummy. The base
year is 1999. The estimated coe¢ cients for time dummies show that from 2001
to 2005 total costs increase linearly. Afterward, i.e. during the the introduction
of PPS, total costs remain pretty constant. This pattern suggests modeling the
time trend with a linear function.14
Assume the following general specication of the dummy variable in the total
costs function in (8):
ln

Cit
Pkit

= i +X
T
it T + dD + tt+ tdtD + vit, (9)
where XTit is the vector of explanatory variables, D is the dummy that assumes
value equal to 1 in the period of policy implementation (2006   2010), and 0
otherwise, and the error component " has been splitted into an individual e¤ect
i and a stochastic error term vit.
The impact of the policy reform can now be measured in two ways, depending
on how the dummy variable is allowed to enter the cost function. By imposing
td = 0, we restrict the attention to policy changes that a¤ect only the constant
term of the total cost function. In this case, dummy variable shifts are interpreted
as the average impact of PPS on costs during the whole period 2006   2010.
Alternatively, if we allow td 6= 0, the impact of PPS can change over time, and
additional information can be provided on the rate of costs increase. We refer
to these two time trend specications as the restricted xed-e¤ects model and
13Remind that the pilot group cannot be used to apply a DID approach for three main reasons.
First, treatment was not randomly assigned. Second, the treated group (pilot NHs) includes only
few observations. Finally, the pilot phase was used to set up the new payment system and some
rules changed afterwards.
14A di¤erent specication of the time trend shows that the inclusion of a squared term leads
to overspecication and does not allow us to identify the impact of the policy change.
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the unrestricted model.15 These will be estimated and compared in the following
section. Since the cost model is in log-log form, the estimated coe¢ cient of the
policy dummy variable is interpreted as percentage change in total costs for small
values of the coe¢ cients, and semi-elasticity for higher values.
By identifying the policy change with a time dummy, we implicitly assume that
in the absence of reform, total costs in the period 2006-2010 would have increased
at the same rate as in the period 1999 2005. Since economic growth may have an
impact on the evolution of prices, for example wages, and therefore costs. Indeed,
the Consumers Price Index (CPI) decreased in the last years considered in the
analysis. To control for changes in costs related to variations in the economic
cycle, we then adjust cost and input prices for the CPI.16
5 Econometric estimation and results
5.1 Estimation approach
In order to choose the most adequate panel data model, we perform a series of
tests on our NHs dataset. Since the likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity (2(40) = 175:68, p-value = 0:000), heteroskedasticity-robust
tests and estimation methods are considered. We examine the xed-e¤ect model
(FE), the random e¤ect model (RE), and the rst di¤erence model (FD) discussed
in Nichols (2007) to create the counterfactual using observations on the same unit
over time. These methods remove the bias due to unobserved characteristics that
15A battery of specication tests was also performed. First, we checked whether the reform
a¤ected other coe¢ cients by building interaction terms of each explanatory variable with the
policy dummy (D) and did not nd signicant evidence. An alternative approach would consist
of estimating two di¤erent models, one before the reform and one after the reform, and compare
the estimated coe¢ cients. However, this strategy allows individual e¤ects to di¤er between the
two periods, which is not desirable. Finally, we used a stochastic frontier approach to estimate
several models, such as the pooled frontier with Mundlak correction (Farsi at al., 2005) and
the true random e¤ect model. The impact of the reform was analyzed in two ways: rst, we
introduced the policy dummy into the deterministic part of the frontier, and second, we compared
the calculated mean ine¢ ciencies using the non parameteric Kruskal-Wallis test. All the model
specications and approaches used conrm the evidence that the new payment system reduced
total costs.
16According to the cantonal law (RL 2.5.4.5 ), salaries and indemnities for public employees
are adjusted using the national Consumer Price Index. Since labor costs represent the largest
proportion of total costs (up to 85%), to deate total costs and input prices seems an appropriate
choice.
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remain constant over time by adding individual-specic e¤ects. Nevertheless, it is
still necessary to control for the panel structure of the dataset, namely for errors
correlated within groups (Cameron and Miller, 2010). If part of the bias is due to
unobservable time-varying factors, our results may still be biased.
The di¤erence between the FE estimator and the FD estimator consists mainly
in the underlying assumption about the speed at which the policy reform a¤ects
the outcome. The FE estimates compare the mean outcome before the policy
reform with the mean outcome in the period after the reform. Instead, the FD
model assumes that the reform has a one-shot e¤ect at the moment of its intro-
duction. Therefore, the impact is fully captured by a jump in outcome in the
year 2006. We rule out the FD model for two reasons. First, from a policy point
of view the relevant question is what are the implications of the new payment
system in the medium term. Second, the introduction of PPS involves a series of
changes that need time to be understood, implemented and optimized.
Both the FE and the RE models include individual-specic e¤ects that allow
to control for any constant unobserved heterogeneity, but they di¤er in the way
they consider these e¤ects. The FE model treats the individual-e¤ects as xed
parameters and allows them to be partially correlated with regressors, accommo-
dating a limited form of endogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). In a policy
evaluation study this property is of particular relevance. The su¢ cient condition
for consistency of the FE model is E[XTit ("it   "i)] = 0, i.e. the policy vari-
able is allowed to be correlated with the persistent component of the error term,
the unobserved heterogeity , but not with deviations from the mean, ("it   "i)
(Wooldridge, 2002). Three main requirements need to be satised when a FE
model is applied. First, to avoid the so called incidental parameters problem, the
panel has to be long enough relative to the number of rms. Second, the main
variable of interest has to vary over time since the FE precludes the estimation of
time-invariant regressors. Third, the percentage within variation of the variables
of interest as with respect to the overall variation should be large enough to avoid
unprecise estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Instead, the RE model instead
assumes that the unobservable individual e¤ects are random variables distributed
independently of the regressors, that is: i  (; 2) and vit  (0; v2), and
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the coe¢ cients are estimated with the Generalized Least Square (GLS) method.
Therefore, no correlation between the individual e¤ects and the error term is per-
mitted. The main disadvantage of the RE model is that the estimates are a¤ected
by the heterogeneity bias when the exogeneity assumption is not satised, and
are, therefore, inconsistent.
To choose between the FE and the RE models we perform the robust version
of the Hausman test using the articial regression approach originally described in
Arellano (1993).17 The null hypothesis of regressors uncorrelated with the group
specic e¤ects is rejected at the 99% level (F (14; 484) = 8:27, p-value = 0:000).
Also, the analysis of the within variation of each variable of the cost function
shows that the percentage within variation over total variation is satisfactory for
all variables of interest.
Standard errors are corrected using the cluster robust estimator based on
Stock and Watson (2006).18 The authors show that the cluster-robust estimator
is preferred in FE models if serial correlation is expected, and it is reasonable to
rely on asymptotic theory. In our sample, the number of clusters is satisfactory to
rely on asymptotic theory for accurate inference (Kezdi, 2004). Also, each cluster
contains a su¢ cient number of observations.19
5.2 Results
Through our regression analysis we are able to control for factors explaining vari-
ation in costs over time not related to changes in the payment system. As a
consequence, we disentagle the general increase in costs from the impact of policy
change. In Table 4 we present the estimated coe¢ cients of the restricted and
unrestricted FE models specied in the previous equation (9). The number of
17The standard Hausman test assumes that the RE model is e¢ cient. A comparison of the
clustered and non clustered standard errors show that this assumption in violated in our case.
When this is the case, the robust Hausman test should be used. This approach consists in re-
estimating the RE model augmented with the original regressors transformed into deviations
from the mean.
18When dealing with panel data, the assumption of independently and identically distributed
errors (iid) is mostly violated due to three main reasons: heteroskedasticity, within-cluster cor-
relation and serial correlation.
19Kezdi (2004) states that a sample of 50 clusters is close enough to innity for accurate
inference if the number of observations for cluster is not too small. A cluster is considered small
if it contains less than ve observations per cluster (Rogers, 1994).
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observations (N) and the model t statistic R2   within are also provided. The
models explain about 92% of the variation in the data.
Estimated coe¢ cients Restricted FE Std. Err. Flexible FE Std. Err.
Y 0.875 0.052 0.863 0.051
Q1 0.285
 0.060 0.281 0.059
Q2 0.409
 0.049 0.471 0.050
Pl 0.779
 0.026 0.795 0.026
Y Y 0.122 0.218 0.084 0.210
Q1Q1 0.540
 0.210 0.540 0.198
Q2Q2 0.204 0.440 0.115 0.422
PlPl 0.201
 0.095 0.211 0.086
Y Q1 -0.030 0.206 0.009 0.196
Y Q2 0.534
 0.140 0.556 0.139
Y Pl 0.055 0.077 0.062 0.078
Q1Pl 0.418
 0.243 0.372 0.223
Q1Q2 -0.172 0.349 -0.077 0.323
PlQ2 -0.219 0.202 -0.249 0.204
t 0.010 0.002 0.015 0.002
d -0.020 0.007 0.076 0.023
td - - -0.012 0.003
0 15.483 0.017 15.385 0.017
N 471 471
R2 0.915 0.920
Notes: Signicance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
Table 4: Results of the restricted and unrestricted xed e¤ect models.
Since the rst-order coe¢ cients are very similar in both specications (re-
stricted and unrestricted model), we focus the discussion on the restricted FE
model. The output coe¢ cient (Y ) measures the total costs elasticity with respect
to output. A value lower than 1 suggests the presence of unexploited economies
of scale in the NH sector. In our case it indicates that an increase by 10% in the
number of resident-days would increase total costs by about 8:75%.
The parameter estimates of output characteristics (Q1 and Q2) show a pos-
itive and highly-signicant value meaning that total costs increase with patients
severity and our quality indicator for the service provided, i.e. the nursing sta¤
ratio. These coe¢ cients can also be interpreted as cost elasticities. The case-mix
coe¢ cient (Q1) indicates that a 10% increase in patients severity increases costs
by almost 3%. More important, a 10% increase in the nursing sta¤ ratio (Q2)
leads to a total costs increase of 4%. The input prices coe¢ cient (Pl) is positive
and signicant, meaning that the costs function is monotonically increasing in
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the vector of input prices. This coe¢ cient provides information on the percent-
age of labor costs over total costs of a representative NH. The estimated share of
labor costs is around 80%, which is very close to the actual sample mean (83%).
Consequently, capital costs represent is around 20% of total costs.
The estimated parameter (t) is highly signicant and indicates that, on av-
erage, total costs increase by 1% each year (1:5% in the unrestricted model). In-
creasing costs can be explained by increasing wages not associated to augmented
productivity (Baumol, 1967), the adoption of more costly technologies or new
procedures implemented in the whole sector due for example to new regulatory
settings. This result conrms the intuition on average costs emerged from the
descriptive analysis presented in Table 3. The second-order coe¢ cients show the
percentage variation in rst-order coe¢ cients in response to a percentage vari-
ation in the regressors. We observe that the second-order coe¢ cient of output
(Y Y ) is not statistcally signicant, meaning that there is no evidence of decreas-
ing economies of scale. Total costs grow at increasing rates with patients severity
(Q1Q1) and labor price (PlPl).
Our main coe¢ cients of interest are those related to the impact of the reform.
In the restricted FE model, the impact of the policy change is captured by the
dummy variable coe¢ cient (d), which measures the average impact of PPS over
the whole period considered. As discussed above, costs increased by roughly 1%
yearly from 1999. However, the negative and highly signicant coe¢ cient of the
policy dummy suggests that the reform reduced mean total costs by 2% from its
introduction in 2006. Concerning the unrestricted FE model, the impact of the
policy reform is allowed to vary in each year and is given by the combination
of changes in the intercept and slope coe¢ cients of the time trend (d and td).
The intercept of the time trend increases by 7:6%. However, the slope coe¢ cient
decreases by 1:2%. The e¤ect of the reform on costs in di¤erent years is given
by TC = 0:076  0:012(t  1998), where t  2006. The e¤ect is  0:02 in 2006,
 0:032 in 2007,  0:044 in 2008,  0:056 in 2009 and  0:068 in 2010. Hence, in
ve years the new payment system led to a reduction in costs of roughly 6:8%.
It is worth noticing that we estimated the impact of the policy change after
controlling for quality, measured by the nursing sta¤ ratio (Q2). As shown in the
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descriptive statistics, the nursing sta¤ ratio has slighly decreased after the reform.
However, the relationship between the nursing sta¤ ratio and quality may not be
straightforward. Although the relative number of nurses has decreased, it might be
that their productivity has increased to preserve the quality of services provided
to the residents. Improved managerial/organizational practices induced by the
reform and hardly measurable, for instance, may have o¤set the small reduction
in the nursing sta¤ ratio. We remind the reader that the nursing sta¤ ratio is
periodically controlled by the cantonal authority who forbids NHs falling below a
given threshold. Therefore, small reductions inQ2 can be interpreted as a positive,
cost-reducing e¤ect of PPS.20 This may also explain why our endogeneity test fails
to reject the exogeneity hypothesis.
6 Conclusions
Because of increasing healthcare costs and continuous pressure on public expen-
ditures to provide healthcare and residential services to the elderly population,
prospective payment systems may represent a promising way to enhance e¢ ciency
in nursing home care. Few empirical studies investigated the e¤ects of PPS in
nursing home care, mostly relying on U.S. data.
In 2006, the Italian speaking canton of Switzerland (Ticino) introduced global
budgets to nance NHs. Through this paper we provided new evidence on the
impact of PPS in the form of global budgets on the performance of NHs.
Among important di¤erences as with respect to the nursing home sector in
the U.S., our context is characterized by nursing home services mainly provided
by nonprot rms as local monopolies. We investigated the impact of PPS on the
costs of providing NH care using a panel data set of 41 nursing homes observed
for a 12-years period from 1999 to 2010. The impact of the policy change was
captured by s time dummy included in panel data models. A counterfactual
approach was also considered to predict costs in the absence of a policy change.
20We perform some sensitivity analysis. For example, we include a dummy variable for the
organizational form. Although the coe¢ cient is statistically signifcant, it does not a¤ect the
estimates of the policy dummy. We also perform the analysis without controlling for the level
of nursing sta¤ ratio. The estimated coe¢ cient of the dumy variable is larger, as expected. We
decide to include Q2 in the cost function to provide more conservative estimates of the impact
of PPS.
23
In this case, the policy impact was calculated as di¤erence between predicted and
observed costs.
Our analysis shows that the new payment system had a mild impact on costs
after controlling for quality aspects using the nursing sta¤ ratio. The new payment
system reduced costs by about 7% after ve years of policy implementation. This
relatively mild e¤ect can be interpreted based on the theoretical predictions. First,
we know that PPS changed incentives only for the overnanced NHs. Second,
these incentives are reduced by the fact that NHs are allowed to use only part of
the savings in an autonomous way (25%). And nally, the model predicts that if
NHs attach a high weight to "human costs" of reorganizing the working conditions
of their employees to reduce costs, then NHs may be better o¤ by not reducing
costs. Coversely, we believe that additional resources make NHs better o¤, as
these allow them to carry out new projects.
Concluding, we found evidence of a cost reducing e¤ect of PPS in the nonprot
nursing home sector in canton Ticino, Switzerland. This result is in line with the
theoretical prdictions of our simple behavioral model. Eventhough we are aware
that we cannot fully control for unobserved factors that may have a¤ected the
cost dynamics of NHs during the period observed, we are condent that in the
present context the assumptions made to identify the impact of PPS are not only
tenable but also very realistic.
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Appendix
Average costs per resident-day in pilot NHs are signicantly lower than in non-
pilot NHs in the period before the full implementation of the reform (Table 5).
In Table 6 we report the average costs of NHs in three di¤erent periods: the
period prior the pilot phase (1999  2002), the pilot phase (2003  2005), and the
period of full policy implementation (2006  2010). Average costs have increased
in both groups between the rst and the second period by about CHF 30 (15:5%)
for pilot NHs, and CHF 20 (8:8%) for non-pilot NHs. Average costs have also
increased between the second and the third period at lower rates. Since pilot NHs
experienced a more remarkable increase in costs between the rst period and the
second period, the subsequent increase of only CHF 5 (2:3%) suggests that they
reacted more strongly to the new payment system than non-pilot NHs (5:1%).
Group Mean costs Std. dev. t-statistic
(1999-2005) on mean di¤erence
Pilot (N=28) 208.50 26.20 5.258
Non pilot (N=266) 229.60 26.71
Notes: All monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs, adjusted by the national Consumer Price Index.
Table 5: Average costs comparison between pilot and non-pilot NHs for the whole
period.
28
1999-2002  2003-2005  2006-2010
(1) (2)-(1) (2) (3)-(2) (3)
Pilot NHs 195.579 30.20 225.700 5.30 230.957
(N=16) 15.5% (N=12) 2.3% (N=20)
Non pilot NHs 220.8078 19.40 240.182 12.20 252.380
(N=145) 8.8% (N=121) 5.1% (N=205)
Notes: All monetary values are in 2005 Swiss francs, adjusted by the national Consumer Price Index.
Table 6: Average costs comparison between pilot and non-pilot NHs in di¤erent
periods.
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